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August 12, 2022 4:11 am

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ISW Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment – August 4 – KyivPost

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Critical Takeaways

  • Ukraine is likely seizing the strategic initiative and forcing Russia to reallocate forces and reprioritize attempts in reaction to Ukrainian counteroffensive functions.
  • Russian forces attempted to progress northwest of Izyum.
  • Ukrainian forces done a collection of localized counterattacks concerning Izyum and Slovyansk and regained positions in a selection of settlements.
  • Russian forces ongoing floor attacks northeast and south of Bakhmut.
  • Russian troops continued makes an attempt to progress on Pisky and done a limited floor assault southwest of Donetsk Town.
  • Russian forces continued to transfer equipment and personnel to northeastern Kherson and western Zaporizhia Oblasts.

Ukraine is most likely seizing the strategic initiative and forcing Russia to reallocate forces and reprioritize endeavours in response to Ukrainian counteroffensive functions. Russian forces are significantly transferring staff and products to Kherson and western Zaporizhia Oblasts at the price of their attempts to seize Slovyansk and Siversk, which they seem to have abandoned. Russian forces are also redeploying military services machines – artillery and aviation in unique – to Crimea from somewhere else in Ukraine. Russian forces have previously withdrawn from or suspended offensive functions on Kharkiv Town and the southern axis to prioritize capturing Luhansk Oblast, but they did so on their possess initiative centered on the transforming priorities of their commanders. Russian forces in this circumstance show up to be responding to the Ukrainian counteroffensive threat in Kherson Oblast fairly than intentionally deciding on targets on which to concentrate their endeavours. Even immediately after Ukrainian forces defeated the Russian endeavor to seize Kyiv early in the war, the Russians were capable to opt for freely to concentrate their functions in the east. Ukraine’s preparations for the counteroffensive in Kherson and the first functions in that counteroffensive put together with the dramatic weakening of Russian forces typically appear to be allowing for Ukraine to start actively shaping the program of the war for the initially time.


The seriousness of the problem dealing with the Russian significant command very likely relies upon on Ukraine’s skill to maintain substantial counteroffensive functions on a number of axes concurrently. If Ukraine is ready to push hard about Izyum as it carries on rolling into the counteroffensive in Kherson, then Russian forces will commence confronting pretty hard options. They will likely have to have to choose both to abandon their westward positions all over Izyum in favor of defending their ground strains of communications (GLOCs) additional north and east or to dedicate far more staff and devices to check out to keep the present-day entrance line. This kind of forces would have to come from a further axis, however, placing other Russian gains at danger.


Russian forces are likely running in five to 7 strike teams of unclear measurement close to Bakhmut, based on the Ukrainian Common Employees descriptions of Russian assaults in the area. Modern Ukrainian Common Staff studies have most often recognized Vershyna, Soledar, Kodema, Bakhmut, and Yakovlvka as the recurring targets of localized concentrated Russian efforts all around Bakhmut.[1] The Russian teams attacking these targets are reportedly functioning out of the nearby settlements of Pokrovske, Streapivka, Roty, Semihirya, and Vidrozhnnya for now.


Explosions occurred near the Donetsk Drama Theater and Penal Colony #124 in occupied Donetsk City on August 4.[2] Russian media commonly publicized the explosions and blamed Ukrainian artillery, but the Ukrainian Place of work of the President denied any shelling of Donetsk Metropolis on August 4.[3] The constrained damage noticeable in the video clips Russia has created as evidence of the Ukrainian attack in close proximity to the Donetsk Drama Theater appears to be inconsistent with artillery shelling.[4] Russian officers have not presented footage of the described attack on Penal Colony #124. Russian milbloggers widely posted the Russian-furnished footage of the aftermath of the explosion close to the Donetsk Drama Theater and used the option to harshly criticize Ukrainian forces for alleged strikes on civilian targets.[5] Were the explosions Ukrainian shelling, they would carry additional psychological weight with DNR supporters since they occurred throughout a farewell ceremony for an occupation forces officer KIA on August 3.[6] Russian forces likely hope to use the psychological reaction of DNR audiences to these types of claimed Ukrainian attacks to garner aid for new offenses in the Avdiivka space and further more recruitment campaigns.

Authors: Kateryna Stepanenko, Layne Phillipson, Karolina Hird, Angela Howard, and Frederick W. Kagan

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The post ISW Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment – August 4 – KyivPost appeared first on Ukraine Intelligence.